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Abstract
This paper establishes that an optimal contract, combining features
of the well-known Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Townsend (1979, 1988)
models, resembles banking. The contract and the associated alloca-
tions are derived from a social planner's problem which contains the
Diamond and Dybvig and Townsend models as sub-problems. The analysis
accomplishes the following: it unites the liquidity preference and
cost minimization literatures in a simple way; resolves the demand
deposit/demand equity problem in the Diamond and Dybvig model; intro-
duces a notion of efficient bankruptcies into the liquidity preference
literature; and poses the government regulation vs. laissez faire
banking debate as a callability problem.
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In this paper I present a model of banking that combines elements
from two of the constructs often used to study the financial inter-
mediation process. The first construct is the Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) model of banking with a continuum of depositors who are each
subject to a privately observed preference shock. The second
construct is the Townsend (1979, 1988) costly state verification model
in which at least one agent has a random endowment, the realization of
2
which can be made public only at a cost.
My model maintains some features from the Diamond and Dybvig model
(i.e., the three period setting, depositors who are subject to a pri-
vately observed preference shock, and a single, nonstorable constant
returns to scale technology). However, it differs from theirs in the
following ways. I assume that the technology has a certain one-period
return and a random two-period return, and that the depositors are
endowed with an input to this technology but do not observe its random
outcome. I also introduce a second type of agent (the entrepreneur),
who has sole access to the production technology but has no endowment
of the input. As in the Townsend model, the entrepreneur privately
observes the random output from the technology, and must incure a cost
to publicly reveal the realization (to the depositors).
Two main results are obtained from this analysis.
First, the model provides a rationale for the emergence of demand
deposits rather than demand equities. In particular, Jacklin (1987)
has noted that in the Diamond and Dybvig model with no aggregate
uncertainty about preferences, the ex ante optimal consumption alloca-
tions can be implemented by equity trading schemes. Jacklin' s analysis
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is important because it opens the Diamond and Dybvig model to the Fama
(1980) critique, which questions the specialness of banks. This paper
shows that the Townsend (1979, 1988) costly state verification analy-
sis, which uses private information on ex post payoffs to rationalize
fixed commitment debt contracts, can be used to resolve this demand
3deposit/demand equity indeterminancy problem.
The argument is as follows. When there is private information
about entrepreneurs' project returns which is costly to verify, an
intermediary (i.e., a coalition of all depositors) will have an
incentive to minimize verification costs by writing contracts that
call for fixed (non-contingent) payments in some states of nature and
contingent payments in others. The non-contingent payments (indexed
for liquidity preference) correspond directly to the demand deposits
4in the Diamond and Dybvig analysis. However the contingent payments,
which represent costly but optimal bankruptcies by the entrepreneurs
(and hence the intermediary), have no analogue in their analysis.
Thus, in addition to resolving the demand deposit/demand equity prob-
lem, my model introduces an alternative notion of (optimal) bankruptcy
into the Diamond and Dybvig model.
Second, my model provides some insight into the two constituent
constructs on which it is based—the liquidity preference and cost
minimization theories of financial intermediation—and the need for
government regulation. In particular, my model contains the Diamond
and Dybvig model (with no aggregate uncertainty and suspension of
convertibility) and the Townsend model as special cases, and gives
rise to an optimal contract of the following form. During the
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planning period an entrepreneur invests in his/her production tech-
nology and commits to: (i) withdraw amount X from the technology at
time 1, paying the intermediary a pre-specif ied, fixed rate of return;
and (ii) withdraw the remaining 1-X at time 2, paying the intermediary
a pre-specif ied, fixed rate of return (if the realization from the
technology is sufficient to cover the promised payment) or calling for
costly state verification and making a liquidation payment (if the
realization is not sufficient to cover the promised payment). Thus,
in this economy the intermediary simply transfers what it receives
from entrepreneurs to the depositors, and this intermediation process
results in an optimal allocation of resources.
My model provides some insights into its constituent models be-
cause the contractual arrangement that 1 study is effectively an
alternative interpretation of the suspension of convertibility policy
proposed by Diamond and Dybvig to eliminate inefficient bankruptcies.
The contract is of particular interest, however, because it appears to
be considerably simpler than what is observed both in practice and in
the literature. Thus, it raises the question—why doesn't this
arrangement arise? More specifically, why in practice do inter-
mediaries tend to call in loans (e.g., during the Great Depression)
when there is a simple, efficient contractual arrangement under which
it is optimal not to? This is another way to ask the perennial
question: Can markets, left to their own accord, achieve an optimal
allocation of resources without government intervention, or are exist-
ing models of the financial intermediation process still incomplete in
important ways?
-4-
The debate in the literature regarding this problem (i.e., govern-
ment regulation vs. private (laissez-faire) banking arrangements)
appears to be dichotomized by two alternative positions. Have loans
been called in, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963) suggest, owing to some
poorly specified disruption in the intermediation process? Or, is it
government policy itself, as Gorton and Haubrich (1987) suggest, which
restricts the ability of intermediaries to write optimal contracts?
It is hoped that posing the question in terras of loan callability may
suggest some strategies for future work which will be useful in re-
solving this debate. The specifics of this discussion, however, will
be deferred until the concluding section.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I, I specify the
structure of the economy. In Section II, I consider the case of a
single entrepreneur, while in Section III I consider the case of
finitely many entrepreneurs. Finally, in Section IV I make some con-
cluding remarks.
I. The Environment
As in the Diamond and Dybvig model, I consider a three period
economy with a planning period and two subsequent consumption periods
indexed by t=0 , 1, 2. The economy is populated by two different types
of agents: a continuum of ex ante identical Diamond and Dybvig-type
"depositors" described by the zero unit interval (i.e., [0,1]), and J
ex ante identical Townsend-type "entrepreneurs" indexed by j=l, •••, J<
All agents maximize expected utility, and will be characterized by
their respective preferences, endowments, access to a technology, and
information.
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All depositors are ex ante identical, but may have different ex
post, as of t=l, utility functions over the consumption of a single
good in periods 1 and 2. Let u (c ,c ), denote these ex post deposi-
9 12
tor preferences, where c is consumption at date t and 9 is a random
variable which is privately observed by each individual depositor at
the beginning of time 1. Let 9 take on one of two values in the set
{1,2} = X, and n. denote the probability that 9 = ieX with H- + II « =
1. Assume both X and (II,, 11^) are known by all agents at time and
that II . is the fraction of depositors who realize 9 = i. This assump-
tion corresponds to the version of the Diamond and Dybvig model with
no aggregate uncertainty. Further assume that u (*) = U(c,) + 8 o c ,9 1 9 z
with U'(c ) > 0, U"(c ) < 0, and B > p, = 0. It follows from this
specification of utility that depositors are risk averse with respect
to first period consumption, risk neutral with respect to second
period consumption, and that 9=1 indicates an impatient depositor
(i.e., one who values first period consumption relative to second
period consumption more highly than a 9 = 2 depositor).
All entrepreneurs are ex ante identical with respect to each
other, but have utility functions over the consumption of the single
good in periods 1 and 2 that are different from the depositors' uti-
lity functions. Let u(c ,c ) = V(c ) + W(c ) denote the entrepre-
neurs' preferences, where V and W are strictly concave, increasing,
twice continuously dif f erentiable , and W'(0) = °° and W (°°) = 0. It
follows from this specification of utility that entrepreneurs are risk
averse with respect to both first and second period consumption.
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Depositors and entrepreneurs have the following endowments and
technologies in this economy. Each depositor is endowed with one unit
of the t=0 good. Each entrepreneur is endowed with a technology of
the following form: (x-.,x ,x„) is in the technology set if (x
n
,x-,x
9 )
= [-x,Xx, (l-X)xy] , for some x > and some Xs[0,l]. This common tech-
nology displays constant returns to scale, and -x indicates the input
of t=0 good, Xx indicates the amount of t=l good withdrawn from the
project at return 1, and (l-X)x indicates the amount of t=2 good
withdrawn at return y.
Let the entrepreneur's second period return, y, be a random
variable with a finite support. In particular, let y = a, for
k = 1, ..., K, a, , > a, > for all k, and E[y] > 1 (where E[»]
denotes an expectation operator). Finally, let the outcomes for y
be drawn independently across the J entrepreneurs. A.s in Townsend
(1979, 1988), assume that each entrepreneur privately observes the
outcome from his/her project at t=2, but has at his/her disposal a
costly state verification technology that can be used to publicly
reveal the realization of y to all other agents. The cost of using
this verification technology (i.e., publicly revealing y) is u units
of time 2 good and will be further specified in the analysis that
follows.
I will complete the model by specifying the following assumptions
about the nature of the asymmetric information and the verification
technology:
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A.l: All agents have the same symmetric information conditions at
time 0.
A. 2: The verification procedure is deterministic.
A. 3: If verification of a particular entrepreneur's realization of y
occurs, then the realization is made known to all agents without
error.
A. 4: If an entrepreneur is indifferent between requesting and not
requesting verification, he/she requests verification.
A. 5: There is ex post enforcement of all agreements.
Assumptions A.l, A. 2, A. 3, and A. 5 correspond directly to the
assumptions in the Townsend (1979, 1988) costly state verification
model. However, assumption A. 4, which resolves any indeterminacy
regarding when verification will occur, is stated somewhat differently
than in Townsend. He assumes (1979, p. 268) that if an entrepreneur
is indifferent between verifying and not verifying the outcome of y,
he/she does not request costly state verification. My statement of
this assumption requires a straightforward amendment to some of
Townsend 's arguments, but will be useful in the analysis that follows.
II. The Model with a Single Entrepreneur (J=l)
In this section I will describe a contract and then state a social
planner's problem involving the choice of the components of the con-
tract. As is quite standard, the planning problem will involve the
maximization of a weighted average of the agents' utilities subject to
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truth telling constraints (which ensure that agents correctly reveal
their asymmetrically observed private information) and aggregate
resource constraints on the consumption of time 1 and time 2 good. I
assume that the planner is restricted to choose only symmetric alloca-
tions and is subject to the same informational conditions as individual
agents (i.e., the planner knows the distribution of types and the
technology at t=0). By symmetric, I mean that all depositors receive
the same ex ante allocation at time 0. Consistent with the restriction
to symmetric allocations, 1 will let c
. (y) denote the consumption of
time t good by each type i depositor and c (y) denote the consumption
of time t good by the single entrepreneur.
Now following and extending Townsend, consider the following con-
tractual arrangement. At t=0, a coalition of all depositors, hence-
forth called the intermediary, and the entrepreneur write the following
kind of contract. Let g 1 denote the actual transfer of time 1 good
from the entrepreneur to the intermediary and g, denote the pre-state
contractual choice of g . Similarly, let g 9 (y) denote the actual
post-state transfer of time 2 good from the entrepreneur to the inter-
mediary as a function of y and g9 (y) denote the pre-state contractual
choice of the function g . Finally, let S denote the values of y for
which verification will occur, S' denote the values for which verifi-
cation will not occur, and S and S' denote the respective pre-state
contractual choices of these sets. Thus, a contract [g,,g 9 (y),S] is
a pre-state specification, contingent on y at t=2, of the amount of
consumption good to be transferred in each period and of when there is
to be verification.
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As in Townsend (1979, p. 269), subsequent to the realization of y,
the entrepreneur announces whether there is or is not to be verifica-
tion. If verification occurs, specified amounts of time 2 good are
forfeited by the entrepreneur, y is revealed to all agents, and the
entrepreneur transfers what was agreed upon. If verification does not
occur, then the entrepreneur may transfer any amount consistent with
the prior specification for the no verification state.
Following Townsend (1979, 1988) I will restrict my analysis to the
class of consistent contracts, where a contract [g,,g 9 (y)>S] is said
to be consistent if
(2.1) §1 = gx ;
(2.2) g 2 (y)
= g 2 (y) for all y; and
(2.3) S = s".
Equations (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) correspond to consistency conditions
(i) and (ii) in Townsend (1979, p. 270).
Townsend (1979, p. 270) establishes that a contract [g,,g«(y),S] is
consistent if and only if:
(2.4) g 2 (y)
= g 2
for yeS'; and
(2.5) g^(y) + y <. g ? for ysS, where g~ is some constant.
Townsend (1979) notes that condition (2.4) is obvious as "under a con-
sistent contract the agreed-upon transfer cannot depend on information
which is known only to [one] agent," and proves that it and equation
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(2.5) are necessary and sufficient in Lemma 2.1, p. 287. Note that no
condition to ensure that g. = g. is necessary since g.. is not con-
tingent. In Lemma 2.2, Townsend (1979, p. 270) establishes that
restricting the analysis to the set of consistent contracts is without
loss of generality. Hence as in Townsend, in what follows I will only
talk about g. , g«(y), and S, and will impose consistency conditions
(2.4) and (2.5) on (g
?
,S) directly.
Finally, following Townsend I assume that the verification cost is
a continuously dif ferentiable, convex function of the contingent
transfer (i.e., u[g„(y)]). Townsend interprets this cost as an audit-
ing expense, and notes that it follows from this specification that
Q
large insolvencies are more expensive than small ones.
I can now state a social planner's problem for an economy with a
continuum of depositors and a single entrepreneur. Let I(y) be an
indicator function with I(y) = indicating that verification does not
occur (i.e., yeS f ) and I(y) = 1 indicating that verification does
occur (i.e., yeS). Finally, let E[*] denote the expectation with
respect to the distribution of y.
Problem 2.1 : Choose X, (g-^g^y) ,Ky)) , cti (y)» ^Cy), for t=l, 2
i=l, 2 to maximize E[u{c ,c (y)}]
subject to: E[E.II .u.{c.
.
,c„. (y)} ] > D,J 1 i i li' 2i ; - '
(2.6a) g
2
(y) = "g"
2
for I(y) = 0;
(2.6b) i2 (y) + u il2 for I(y) = 1;
and
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(2.7) E[u
9
{c
19
,c
20 (y)}] > E[uQ{c1Qf ,c29? (y)}] for 9,9'eX;
(2.8a) n
i
c
11
+ n
2
c
12 <_ g1 ;
(2.8b) g
x
+ c
1
<^ X;
(2.9) n
i
c
21
+ H
2
c
22 <_ g2
for I(y) = 0;
(2.9b) g 2 + c 2 (y) < [1-X]y for I(y)
= 0;
(2.10a) n
i
c
21 (y)
+ n
2
c
22 (y) <^ g2 (y)
for I(y) = 1; and
(2.10b) g (y) + c (y) < [1-X]y - y for I(y) = 1.
The first constraint states that the depositors' utility must be
9
at least D. Equations (2.6a) and (2.6b) restate consistency con-
ditions (2.4) and (2.5) for the two alternative verification states.
Equation (2.7) is an incentive compatibility constraint on depositors
which states that the utility that a depositor receives from truth-
fully revealing his/her type (i.e., requesting the payoffs associated
with 9) is at least as great as the utility that the depositor receives
from misrepresenting his/her type (i.e., requesting the payoffs asso-
ciated with 9' * 9).
The remaining constraints are resource constraints on the alloca-
tion of time 1 and time 2 good on the intermediary and all agents,
respectively. Constraint (2.8a) is a resource constraint on the divi-
sion of the time 1 transfer by the intermediary between the depositor
types. Constraint (2.8b) is a resource constraint on the aggregate
consumption of time 1 good by all agents (i.e., the depositors and the
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entrepreneur ). Constraints (2.9a) and (2.10a) are resource constraints
on the division of the time 2 transfer by the intermediary between the
depositor types in the no verification and verification states, respec-
tively. Finally, constraints (2.9b) and (2.10b) are resource con-
straints on the aggregate consumption of time 2 good by all agents in
the two verification states.
Characterization of the Solution
Since the objective is continuous and the constraint set is com-
pact, a solution to Problem 2.1 exists. However, in order to describe
some aspects of the solution, it is helpful to analyze Problem 2.1 in
stages. In particular, in order to be able to appeal to Townsend's
results that characterize g9 (y) and S, I state the following (time 2)
problem and show: (a) the time 2 problem is identical to a problem
considered by Townsend, and (b) any solution to Problem 2.1 is a solu-
tion to the time 2 problem.
Let C«(y) = I,n.c
? .(y) denote the total second period consumption
by depositors. Working backwards, consider the following (time 2)
problem:
Problem 2.1b : For any X, K, g , c , c , c , choose c (y), C (y),
maximize E[u{c. ,c„(y)}
]
subject to: E[C (y)] > K, and (2.6a), (2.6b), (2.9a), (2.9b),
(2.10a), and (2.10b).
Problem 2.1b is identical to Problem 3.1 in Townsend (1979, p. 272).
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In Proposition 3.1, Townsend (1979, p. 273) establishes that when
y[g (y)] is a continuously dif ferentiable , convex function of the con-
tingent transfer, as I have assumed, the following results hold.
First, the verification interval is comprised of two sets, given by
S = {y:y<y*} and S' = {y:y>y*}. This result, stated as Proposition
3.1, indicates that verification occurs for outcomes of y which are
less than some critical value and verification does not occur for
outcomes of y which are above this value. Second, the verification
interval is nontrivial. This result, established by example, states
that the verification region need not be either empty or the entire
interval. Thus, it follows from Proposition 2.1b that bankruptcy by
the entrepreneur (and hence the intermediary) occurs in some but not
all states of nature.
I now establish:
Proposition 2.1 : Any solution to Problem 2.1 is a solution to Problem
2.1b.
Proof : Denote by tildes """ a solution to Problem 2.1 and let C„(y) =
n,cL,(y) + H«c
?
«(y). Suppose by way of contradiction that [C
2
(y), c 2 (y)]
is not a solution to Problem 2.1b for X = X and K = E[C
2 (y)] = K.
Moreover, let [C(y), c~(y)] be a solution to Problem 2.1b for X = X
and K = K. I show that """" cannot be a solution to Problem 2.1 by
showing that an alternative solution is feasible for Problem 2.1 and
is Pareto superior to the "~" solution. The alternative is X, c..
,
^11" C12 l c2^ and c22^ satisf y inS n 2 C22^ = C2^ and c21^ = °*
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First, since [c
2 -(y), c22 (y)] appear in ex ante depositor utility
only by way of EflUc^Cy)] and since EtlUc^Cy)]
_< E[C
2 (y)], it follows
that this alternative is Pareto superior to the "~" solution. As
regards feasibility, since the "~" solution satisfies the t=l resource
constraint and since the t=2 resource constraints are part of Problem
2.1b, the alternative solution satisfies all of the resource con-
straints. As regards the consistency constraints, the alternative
solution satisfies the constraints for the entrepreneur as they are
a
part of Problem 2.1b. All that remains to be shown is that [c 91 (y),
A
c..(y)] and [c...., c..-] satisfy the consistency constraint for the
depositors (i.e., inequality (2.7)).
a a
Let w. = E[c_.(y)] and w. = E[c .(y)], for 1=1,2, To satisfy the
i 2i i 2i
A A
depositors' consistency constraint, [c 9 ,(y), c (y)] must be chosen so
that:
(2.10a) U
1
(c
11 ) 2 U 1 (c 12 ), and
(2.10b) U
2 (£12 )
+ 8
2
w
2 _>
U
2
(cn ) + B2wr
By consistency of the ""*" solution, (2.10a) holds and
(2.ii) u
2
(c
12 ) + e 2
w
2 >
u
2
(5n ) + 8 2*1*
A A •* A A
However, since w.. = and E[C
(? (y)] _> E[C„(y)], w 1 _< w. and w~ > w„
.
Hence, (2.11) implies (2.10b).
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Problem 2.1b yields optimal consumption allocations of the form
cAy) = f(X,K;y), C„(y) = h(A,K;y), a transfer function g 2 (y) =
g 9 (X,K;y) and an indicator function l(y) = I*(X,K;y). Continuing to
work backwards, the time 1 problem can be written:
Problem 2.1a : Choose X, K, g , c , c , c 2 , c21 (y), c22 (y) to
maximize E[u{c, , f ( * )}
]
subject to: E[X.II .u. {c. . ,c . (y)} ] > U, (2.7), (2.8a), (2.8b), andJ l l l li 2i —
h(X,K;y) = E.n
i
c
2
.(y).
I now show that Problem 2.1a can be further simplified.
Proposition 2.2 : Any solution to Problem 2.1a has c
?1 (y) = 0.
Proof : Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists a solution
to Problem 2.1a which does not satisfy c 91 (y) = 0. Denote this solu-
tion by X, c , c , c
2
, c , c 22> K, with c 2 > 0. I
show that "~"
cannot be a solution to Problem 2.1a by showing that for X, K, c
,
c.
1
,
c. „ , h( # ), f(') fixed at the M ~" solution, when cL. > I can
construct an alternative allocation [c 91 , cooK with IT c ?1 (y) +
n
2
C
22 (y)
= C(y) = h(,)
'
but C
21 (y)
< C
21 (y)
and C
22 (y)
> C
22 (:y) •
This
alternative allocation satisfies the resource and consistency con-
straints from Problem 2.1a but increases the utility of depositors
without decreasing the utility of the entrepreneur.
The resource constraints at t=l and t=2 remain satisfied since
only the division of c
?1 and c ?9 is changed in the proposal and all
else, including h( # ), remains fixed. The consistency constraints are
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also satisfied as the constraints on the entrepreneur, and the con-
straint on type 1 depositors, U-.Cc....) J> U-Cc 1? ) are unchanged in the
A
proposal. The constraint on type 2 depositors, U
9
(c ) + E[c ?9 (y)] _>
A A
U2^11^ + E f c 2l^ y ^» is satisfied as well since E[c 22 (y)] > E[c22 (y)]
A
and E[c«-(y)] < Etc^-Cy)] by construction and the """ solution is con-
sistent. Finally, this proposal does not affect the utility of
A
depositors since E[c22 (y)] > E[c99 (y)] and c 9 ,(y) is not an argument
of ex ante depositor utility.
II
It follows from Proposition 2.2 that Problem 2.1a can now be
restated as follows:
Problem 2. la' : Choose A, K, g , c. , c , c 9 to
maximize E[u{c. ,f ( * )} ]
subject to: E[S .II .u. {c.
.
,h( • )} ] >UJ i i l li —
(2.7) E[u
6
{c
ie»
C
28 } ] -
E[U
9
{C
19
,,C
26 ,}]
for9
'
9
' eX
>
(2.8a) n
i
c
11
+ n
2
c
12 <_ g 1 ;
(2.8b) §! + c
x
i x ;
Problem 2.1a' is identical to Problem 2.1a except that it follows from
Proposition 2.2 that c? ,(y) = and c99 (y) = C 9 (y), so that the divi-
sion of the aggregate t=2 transfer of consumption good to the deposi-
tors is already determined.
The solution to Problem 2.1a' (i.e., the stage 1 problem) is of
particular economic interest because it resembles the Diamond and
Dybvig model with no aggregate uncertainty (i.e., (II, ,H«) known). In
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their analysis, as in ray model, agents cannot achieve the optimal
(full-information) allocation by competitive markets owing to non-
verifiable private information about depositors' types. Diamond and
Dybvig argue that the demand deposit contract, which accommodates
depositors' private information, is an alternative allocation mecha-
nism that can be used to achieve an optimal allocation. This argument
applies directly to my analysis as well.
However, Diamond and Dybvig (1983, p. 402) also claim that the
demand deposit contract which they propose "has an undesirable
equilibrium (a bank run)" associated with it, and propose a policy
—
namely, suspension of convertibility—which can be used to eliminate
the run. It is important to note that runs arise in the Diamond
and Dybvig model because depositors fear (for some conjectures about
cohorts' behavior) that all investment will be completely liquidated
at t=l, and consequently their promised two-period returns will not be
available. The Diamond and Dybvig suspension policy eliminates the
run problem by assuring all depositors that some amount of t=2 good
will indeed be available. My model also displays this feature, but
differs from the Diamond and Dybvig analysis in that suspension of
convertibility is effectively embedded into the contract mechanism.
In particular, in my model the entrepreneur produces X amount of
t=l good at the first stage (irrespective of ex post depositor
behavior), leaves the remainder (i.e., [1-X]) in production until the
second stage, and the intermediary simply honors the withdrawal
requests it receives from depositors (subject to its resource con-
straints). Thus as under the Diamond and Dybvig suspension policy,
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since depositors are certain that investment will not be completely
liquidated at the first stage (under the contract that I propose),
speculative runs do not arise. However, bankruptcies do occur (in
some states of nature), but as in Townsend, they are consistent with
an optimal allocation of resources.
III. The Generalized Model
In this section I extend the model with a continuum of depositors
and a single entrepreneur to one with a continuum of depositors and
finitely many entrepreneurs. Following Townsend, I begin by consider-
ing two symmetric, ex ante identical entrepreneurs. For simplicity I
assume that the intermediary evenly divides all t=0 good between the
two ex ante identical entrepreneurs. Agents' preferences, endowments,
access to the technologies, and information are the same as in
Section I.
Again following and extending Townsend, consider the following
contractual arrangement which resembles banking. At t=0 the inter-
mediary, a coalition of all depositors, and each entrepreneur write a
contract, and the two entrepreneurs write a contract. I define these
agreements as follows: Let g 1
J denote the actual post-state transfer
of time 1 good from entrepreneur j to the intermediary and g denote
12 Ai
the pre-state contractual choice of g. . Let g~ (y-, ,yo)> for A=i,j'
and j=l,2, denote the actual post-state transfer of time 2 good, con-
tingent on the returns from both entrepreneurs, from entrepreneur j to
—Ai
agent A (i.e., the intermediary or the entrepreneur), and g~ (y-,,y«)
denote the pre-state contractual choice of this function. Finally,
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let S. denote the set of realizations of y. for which verification
J J
will occur, S. denote the set of realizations for which verification
J
will not occur, and let S. and S. denote their respective pre-state
J J
contractual choices. Thus, a contract [g- ,g» (y-i»y2 )fS.] for A=i,j'
and j=l,2, is a pre-state specification, contingent on y and y at
t=2, of the amount of consumption good to be transferred in each
period and of when there is to be verification.
Subsequent to the realization of y., each entrepreneur announces
whether there is or is not to be verification. If verification
occurs, y. is revealed to all agents and <t».(y.) units of time 2 good
are forfeited to nature. If both agents are verified, they transfer
what was agreed upon (i.e., g„ (y,,y
2
) = So yl ,y2^
for
^i»y2^ eS lxS 2^
'
If entrepreneur j verifies but j' does not, the entrepreneurs transfer
an amount consistent with: (i) a known value of y., and (ii) y. t in
j j
the agreed upon nonverif ication region (i.e., g~ (y,,y 2 )
= go (y ) for
(y, ,y~)eS .x(S
.
,
)
? ). Finally, if neither agent verifies, they transfer
an amount consistent with the prior specification for the no verifica-
Ai —A.i — —
tion states (i.e., g2
J (y
1 ,y 2
) = g 2
for (y
1 ,y 2
)e((S
.
)
*x(S
.
,
)
'
).
Townsend (1979, p. 280) restricts his analysis to the class of
—
'i i ""A i ~
consistent contracts where, as in Section II, a contract [g-, ,g« ,S,J
for A=i,j' and j=l,2 is said to be consistent if:
(3.1) g[i =^j ;
(3.2) g^ = g^;
(3.3) S. = ?..
J J
-20-
These equations are analogous to consistency conditions (2.1), (2.2),
and (2.3) in Section II.
In Lemma 5.1, Townsend (1979, p. 280) establishes that conditions
13
of the following form ensure that a bilateral contract is consistent.
A contract [g_ ,g« ,S.], for A=l,j' and j=l,2, is consistent if and
only if:
(3.4) g2
j (y
1
,y
2
) =i^j for (yi ,y 2 )eS lt xS 2 ,;
(3.5) g2
J (y
1
,Y 2
) =g^j (y
j
) for (y
1 ,y 2
)eS.x(Sj) )
1
;
(3.6a) g^
:i (y
1
,y
2
) - * (y ) < g^
J
' (y , ) for (y^y^e?^; and
(3.6b) i^j (y.) - (y ) < "g^ for yj£S..
As before, these conditions will be imposed directly and hence I will
only talk about [g- ,g ? (y ) ,S] in what follows.
Let I(y.) be an indicator function with I(y.) = indicating that
verification does not occur (i.e., y.eS.) and I(y.) = 1 indicating
J J J
that verification does occur (i.e., y.eS.). I can now state a planning
J J
problem for an economy with a continuum of depositors and two entre-
preneurs.
Problem 3.1
:
Choose X., (g^g^y^Y^.Ky.)), C
t i
(y)
'
C
t
(y) f ° r
i-1,2, t=l,2, A=i,j', and j-1,2 to:
maximize E.a,E[u.{c. ,c«(y)}
]
subject to: E[ Z .II ,u_ {c,
.
,c.
. (y)} ] • D;
l l i li 2i —
-21-
M - Aj(3.4) g 2 J (y 1 ,y 2 ) - §2 for ^V = I(y 2 } = 0;
(3.5)
(3.6a)
(3.6b)
g2
j (y
1 »y 2
) = 4J(y j } for I(y j } = 1 and I(y j f)
= 0;
g2
j (y
1
,y
2
)
- tjtyjl 1 ^'^j^ for I(y i } = I(y 2 ) = 1;
A3 A3
g 2
J (y.) -
1
(y
1
) < §2 for I(y i }
= 1;
o.7) Ery c 19 > c 2 9 (y)}] 2 EK {c i A .> c 9A» ( y9 )}9 l 18" 29' x '2
AJ -(3.8a) n iC;L1 + nc12 <_ Z g^ = C1 ;
(3.8b) c| <_ X. - g*j ;
(3.8c)
(3.9a)
(3.9b)
c, + z.ci : z.x.i
1 J 1 - J J
n
i
C
21
+ K
2
C
22 -
Z
j
g 2
E C
2
f ° r I(y
i
} = I(y
2
} = ° ;
c
J
2
(y.) < [l-X.ly.-gJ -*2 g 2 f ° r I(y l }
= I(y
2
} = 0:
(3.9c) C + E. CJ(y.) £ E.[l-X.)]y for Ky^ = I(y2 ) - 0;
J J J J -J
(3.10a) HjC^y.) + n
2
c
22 ( y .)
< g2
J (yJ + g^' = c
2
(
^j ) for
I(y.) = 1 and I(y. f ) = 0;
J -J
(3.10b) cj(y.) < [1-Xjlyj - g 2
J
(Yj ) - g^ CYj) + S
3
2
2
~ jlyjl fo1
I(y.) = 1 and I(y.,) = 0;
(3.10c) c^(y
1 ,y2
) < [1-X.]y., - g* j (yj) - g^ frj) + §2 for
I(y.) = 1 and I(y.,) = 0;
J J
(3.10d) C
2
(y ) + cJ(y.) + c^ ' ( 3^,3^) 1 Ej [1
"X
j
3y j " *j [y j
] for
I(y.) = 1 and I(y. f ) = 0;
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(3.11a) n iC21 (yi ,y 2 ) + V22 (yr y2 ) * Sj*2 ^l'^ ~ C2 (yl'y2 )
for I(y ) = I(y
2
) = 1;
(3.11b) cJ(
y;L
,y2
) < [1-X
j
]y
j
- g^Cy^) - g^Cy^)
+ g2
j '(y
1 »y 2
)
-
jiy.j] for I( y i )
= 1<y2 )
= 1; and
(3.11c) C
2
( yi ,y 2 )
+ cJ(Yl ,y 2 ) < I j
[l-X
j
]y
j
- ^[y^ for Ky^
= Ky
2
) = 1.
Problem 3.1 is identical to Problem 2.1 except that the objective
function is now a weighted average of the two entrepreneurs' utilities
(where the weights Z.a. = 1 and a. >^ are exogenously given), and the
resource constraints are defined over the joint verification regions.
The objective is continuous and the constraint set is compact, hence a
solution exists.
As in Section II, Problem 3.1 can be decomposed into stages. Using
Townsend's assumptions about the verification cost and restrictions on
exchange, the stage 2 problem is identical to his Problem 5.1. Since
it can be shown that any solution to Problem 3.1 must satisfy the time
2 problem, the results established by Townsend apply directly. Fur-
ther, the stage 1 component corresponds to the Diamond and Dybvig
model. Hence the results from their analysis apply as well. A.s in
Townsend, this analysis can be further extended to the case of
finitely many entrepreneurs.
-23-
IV. Concluding Remarks
This paper establishes that an optimal contract, combining
features of the well known Diamond and Dybvig and Townsend models,
resembles banking. The contract and the associated allocations are
derived from a social planner's problem. Features of the contract
are described by decomposing the overall planner's problem into two
sub-problems. This decomposition allows me to appeal directly to
results established by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Townsend (1979,
1988).
The analysis accomplishes the following. First, it unites the
liquidity preference and cost minimization literatures in a simple
way. Second, it resolves the demand deposit/demand equity indeter-
minancy problem in the Diamond and Dybvig model (with the precise
nature of the solution depending on the specification of agents'
preferences, the verification technology, and the distribution func-
tion—see Townsend (1988) for a discussion and some simulations).
Third, it introduces a notion of efficient bankruptcies into the
14liquidity preference literature. Finally, the analysis poses the
government regulation vs. laizze-faire banking debate as a callability
problem, and suggests that its resolution may lie along two lines: a
deeper understanding of the theoretical rationalizations of call-
ability, and a careful analysis of the historical evidence on legal
restrictions which prohibit banks from writing optimal contracts.
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Footnotes
Liquidity risk in this context is the risk that too many agents
will wish to withdraw in a given time period and the intermediary will
not have enough assets on hand to meet this demand. I consider the
version of the Diamond and Dybvig model with no aggregate uncertainty
about the preference shock, hence all agents know the total number of
withdrawals in each time period if depositors correctly reveal their
type. This specification of the economy (i.e., no aggregate uncer-
tainty and truthful revelation of type) is equivalent to the standard
informational restriction that the principle knows the distribution of
agent types in the economy, but does not know the identity of any
particular agent (e.g., see Villamil (1988)).
2
The Diamond and Dybvig and the Townsend models are seminal con-
tributions to two main branches of the financial intermediation liter-
ature: liquidity preference models and cost minimization models of
financial intermediation. For example, the following papers incorpor-
ate aspects of the Diamond and Dybvig model: Bernanke and Gertler
(1985), Haubrich and King (1984), and Smith (1984); while papers which
incorporate aspects of the Townsend model are: Boyd and Prescott
(1986), Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Williamson
(1987). For a more extensive discussion of the literature, and an
excellent report on the historical development of the study of finan-
cial intermediaries, the reader is referred to Gertler (1988).
3
A recent alternative to the costly state verification analysis
(on which much of the cost minimization view of financial intermedia-
tion is based) is the costly state falsification model of Lacker and
Weinberg (1989). However, the contracts which emerge in their
environment resemble "equity" instruments (vs. debt) most closely.
4
In this paper (as in Diamond and Dybvig), demand deposits allow
agents to diversify their liquidity risk. However, see Calorairis and
Kahn (1988) for an alternative explanation of demandable debt.
The apparent asymmetry in agents' access to a verification tech-
nology in my model stems from the fact that there is no aggregate
uncertainty associated with the preference shock (hence there is no
need to verify) , but there is aggregate uncertainty associated with
the investment technology. However, an alternative rationalization of
the absence of preference shock verification, which would preclude its
use even in the presence of aggregate uncertainty, is that it is
infinitely costly to ascertain this information.
Mookherjee and Png (1987) study the Townsend (1979) model with a
stochastic verification technology. They note that the choice of a
stochastic or deterministic technology (i.e., assumption A. 2) can
change the nature of the optimal contracts under certain circum-
stances, but that assumption A. 3 (i.e., perfect verification) is not
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restrictive as the results from the model can be extended for small
errors by continuity arguments.
In particular, Townsend (1979, p. 270, Lemma 2.1) states a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for truthful revelation by an entrepre-
neur with a strict inequality as he assumes that if the entrepreneur
is indifferent between verifying and not verifying the outcome of y
he/she does not request costly state verification. However, the
analogous (consistency) constraint in my model will be stated with a
weak inequality owing to assumption A. 4. It is important to note that
Townsend' s proof of Lemma 2.1 remains valid under this assumption.
o
Townsend refers to the situation where u [ * ] is a continuously
dif ferentiable , convex function of the transfer function as the
"classical case." Although he also establishes results for the
"nonclassical case," in which y is equal to a constant, those results
depend on additional assumptions.
9
D, an exogenous constant, is effectively a weight on depositors
utility (predetermined by the planner or by some earlier bargaining
process)
.
Proposition 3.1 specifies S* with a strong inequality. However,
I specify S* with a weak inequality owing to the difference between my
assumption A. 4 and the corresponding assumption used by Townsend.
This amendment does not change the nature of the result.
Postlewaite and Vives (1987) provide an alternative example in
which there is a unique equilibrium with a positive probability of a
bank run. They further argue that when the selection between the good
and the bad outcomes in the Diamond and Dybvig analysis is modeled as
a game with incomplete information, then bank contracts cannot neces-
sarily achieve the optimal allocation in the Diamond and Dybvig model
(nor in their model).
12
Note that the entrepreneurs do not exchange time 1 good as it is
not contingent.
13
Lemma 5.1 in Townsend (1979, p. 280) is stated with strict in-
equalities. Equations (3.6a) and (3.6b) are stated with weak in-
equalities in my analysis owing to my statement of assumption A. 4.
14
Introducing a notion of efficient bankruptcies (vs. inefficient
speculative runs) into the liquidity preference literature defines two
points of a continuum of possibilities. The most interesting cases
are likely to be those which lie between the two extremes, as models
which contain both types of bankruptcies (and where it is possible to
distinguish between them) are necessary before economists can offer
sensible policy advice. In that sense, this paper is very much in the
spirit of Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya
(1988).
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